The emphasis in post-Keynesian macroeconomics on wage-versus pro…t-led growth may not have been helpful. The pro…t share is not an exogenous variable, and the correlations between the pro…t share and economic growth can be positive for some exogenous shocks but negative for others. The terminology, second, suggests a unidirectional causality from distribution to aggregate demand while in fact distribution can itself be directly a¤ected by shifts in aggregate demand. The reduced form correlations, third, depend on interactions with the labor market, and a focus on the goods market can be misleading. If, fourth, empirical estimates are taken at face value, the support for wage-led conclusions is much weaker than suggested by the literature. A focus on the growth-bene…ts of a reduction in inequality, …nally, makes for an impoverished policy discussion.
Introduction
The distribution of income is of the greatest importance. It is important in its own right and also because of interactions between distribution and other economic and social outcomes. Not everyone agrees with these claims. In fact, a focus on distribution has been seen as distinctly harmful by some; Lucas (2004) famously commented, "Of the tendencies that are harmful to sound economics, the most seductive, and in my opinion the most poisonous, is to focus on questions of distribution". Fortunately, there are signs that inequality will now be receiving greater attention throughout the profession.
To their great credit the post-Keynesian and neo-Marxian traditions have always emphasized distributional issues. The forms, however, that this attention have taken may not be the most productive. In the post-Keynesian tradition the concepts of wage-and pro…t-led growth have dominated the discussion. The concepts are de…ned with reference to the properties of aggregate demand, and countless contributions have elaborated ways in which the functional distribution could a¤ect the di¤erent components of demand. Empirical studies have followed up by estimating these e¤ects econometrically.
I want to question this approach. Concepts of wage and pro…t led growth are well-de…ned in benchmark models with restrictive assumptions. The concepts become less helpful -and possibly misleading -if the restrictive assumptions are relaxed. In general, it makes little sense to refer to an economy as being wage or pro…t led. More speci…cally, I shall argue that reduced-form correlations between income distribution and economic growth depend on the nature of the underlying exogenous shocks or policy interventions. For some shocks the reduced-form correlation between the wage share and economic growth may be positive, suggesting a wage-led economy; for other shocks the correlation may be negative, suggesting a pro…t-led economy.
the concepts of wage and pro…t led growth are unhelpful when it comes to analyzing what interventions -whether by policy makers or social movements -could be used to change economic outcomes in the direction of less inequality and greater social justice while maintaining full employment. the distribution of income may itself depend on aggregate demand. Reducedform correlations between the pro…t share and aggregate demand may re‡ect the e¤ects of aggregate demand on pro…ts rather than (or as well as) the e¤ects of distribution on aggregate demand.
whether an economy is wage or pro…t led depends not only on the properties of the goods market but also on the speci…cation of the rest of the economy, including the labor market.
empirical studies of the e¤ects of distribution on aggregate demand and economic growth have produced weak and inconclusive results. Problems that are intrinsic to macroeconometrics -including questionable data quality and short time series -account for some of the weaknesses but the speci…cation of the regressions, the econometric approach and the interpretation of the results can be questioned too.
a strong focus on the growth-bene…ts of redistribution makes for an impoverished policy discussion. Support for policies that reduce inequality need not be contingent on whether these policies will tend to raise aggregate demand and the rate of economic growth.
The time dimension of the relation between income distribution and growth is sometimes left ambiguous. The original contributions to the literature on wage-led growth took a medium to long run perspective. This would also seem to be the perspective of many recent contributions, including the much cited studies in Lavoie and Stockhammer (2013) . Indeed, gains from an increase in the wage share would seem rather uninteresting if they are not sustainable beyond the short run. This paper therefore considers medium or long run interactions between distribution and economic growth. It should be noted, however, that the time dimension can be critical for the observed correlation, and the wage/pro…t led terminology is sometimes being used with respect to short-run cyclical patterns (e.g. Barbosa-Filho and Taylor 2006, von Arnim and Barrales 2015). The forces which determine long-run correlations may be quite distinct from those that govern short-run correlations, and the usefulness of the terminology to describe cyclical patterns is beyond the scope of this paper. 1 Section 2 provides a brief outline of the benchmark analysis of wage-and pro…t-led growth. Section 3 describes a general mathematical structure that highlights some of the issues. Section 4 discusses the dependence of reduced-form correlations on the underlying shock. Section 5 introduces a demand-dependent distribution of income. Section 6 analyzes the e¤ects of distributional change on employment and economic growth when a labor market is added to the model. Econometric work on wage-and pro…t-led growth is considered in section 7. Section 8 o¤ers a few concluding remarks.
The benchmark analysis
The Kaleckian model that has dominated post-Keynesian macroeconomics was developed independently by Rowthorn (1981) and Dutt (1984) and subsequently modi…ed by Marglin and Bhaduri (1990) . Using standard notation the Dutt version of the model can be stated as follows: 1 Blecker (2016) suggests that the empirical literature has paid too little attention to the time dimension.
where I; S; K; ; u and g denote investment, saving, the capital stock, the pro…t share, the output capital ratio and the net accumulation rate. Assuming a …xed coe¢cient production function, the output capital ratio can be used as a measure of capacity utilization, and I shall refer to it as the utilization rate. With a constant utilization rate, the growth rate of output is equal to the accumulation rate. The model produces steady growth solutions for the utilization rate and the growth rate;
and the e¤ects of a change in are given by
Dutt assumes that the 'Keynesian stability condition' is satis…ed; that is, s > + . The model -using Marglin and Bhaduri's terminology -is therefore stagnationist ( du d < 0) and growth is wage led (
Dutt's speci…cation of investment and saving can be seen as a special case of a generic post-Keynesian speci…cation:
Using these generic forms, the e¤ects of changes in the pro…t share can be written
The generic speci…cation does not necessarily produce a stagnationist and wage led economy. Dutt's version implies three restrictions on the generic form: (i)
Marglin and Bhaduri's in ‡uential contributions questioned the third of these restrictions. Speci…cally, they suggested replacing (1) by
Hence, keeping the saving function (2),
The re-speci…cation eliminates restriction (iii), and without (iii) the restrictions (i) and (ii) no longer ensure that i s will be negative. Essentially the Marglin-Bhaduri modi…cation allows a stronger sensitivity of investment to pro…ts relative to the sensitivity to utilization. As a result of this relative weakening of the utilization e¤ect on investment, the model allows for the possibility of both pro…t-and wage-led outcomes.
It should be noted that the same widening of the range of possibilities to include pro…t-led regimes could be achieved by abandoning one of the …rst two restrictions and retaining the third:
A Harrodian approach questions the validity of the 'Keynesian stability condition' in the long run (Auerbach and Skott 1988, Skott 2012) . If restriction (i) is reversed and i u > s u ; the sign of the denominator in (12) changes but the numerator may still be negative. It follows that utilization -and a fortiori economic growth -can be pro…t led.
The classical saving function -assuming that there is no saving out of wage income -is often introduced as a simplifying assumption with the implied suggestion that results carry over to the more general case in which the saving propensity out of pro…ts exceeds the saving propensity out of wages. The simplifying assumption is not innocuous, however: if (ii) is relaxed to allow saving out of wage income then (i) and (iii) no longer ensure that the numerator in the expression for du =d will be negative.
where s 0 is the saving rate out of wages and s is the di¤erence between the saving rates. Then
Thus, abandoning any one of the three restrictions may reverse the e¤ect of changes in the pro…t share on utilization. Marglin and Bhaduri retained the …rst two restrictions and relaxed the third. Whatever assumptions are being made about the relative magnitudes of i u ; i ; s u and s ; the concepts of wage-and pro…t-led growth are well-de…ned in the benchmark model if the distribution of income is exogenous and, second, the parameters of the saving and investment function are independent of shocks to the distribution of income.
Mathematical structure
It may be useful to consider a general mathematical structure before turning to the speci…cs of 'wage-led' growth. Assume that two endogenous variables, x and y, are determined by the equations
where Z is a vector of exogenous variable. One could now ask whether x is y led. But the question seems neither helpful nor interesting. Solving equations (18)- (19) -assuming for simplicity that they have a unique solution -we can write x and y as functions of the exogenous variables
The solutions in (20) - (21) do not exclude reduced-form correlations between x and y, but the correlations are contingent. Shocks to exogenous variables may a¤ect both x and y; and the resulting correlation between the two will -in general -depend on which of the exogenous Z-variables have been shocked, as well as on the properties of both the F and H functions. Two well-known examples may illustrate the point. Consider a standard IS M P model:
where government consumption (G) and the target rate of in ‡ation (p T ) are among the exogenous variables. Equation (22) is the IS relation, and the MP relation in equation (23) > 0: Although often overlooked, the restrictiveness of the classical saving assumption has been noted by, among others, Taylor (1990) and Lavoie (1992) .
One can examine the properties of the two equations -including the signs of the partials F i and H Y but it is unhelpful to ask whether output is interest-led in the IS-MP model. If, nevertheless, the question is being asked, attempts to settle the issue empirically by estimating the a relation between Y and i would be misguided. The reduced-form correlation between output and the interest rate depends on whether ‡uctuations in Y and i re ‡ect shocks to government consumption G (or other components of autonomous demand) or shocks to the in ‡ation targetp T (or other determinants of monetary policy). As a second example, consider a standard microeconomic model of a single market. Do we want to refer to output as being 'price led' if the correlation between output and price happens to be positive for a particular market over a particular period?
4 Shock-dependent reduced-form correlations
The general argument has implications for the literature on wage-led growth. This section examines issues associated with the exogenous variables and their e¤ects, assuming that there is no direct feedback from growth to distribution (corresponding to the special case of (18)- (19) in which H x = 0); section 5 considers implications of feedback e¤ects from growth to distribution (H x 6 = 0).
The 'wage-led versus pro…t-led' terminology focuses on distributional outcomes: it leaves open the question of how to e¤ect changes in distribution and it may give the impression that the precise manner in which distribution is changed will be of secondary importance.
Assume that policy makers want to increase the wage share. The wage share is not itself an instrument, but a variety of interventions could be used in an in‡uence distribution. Lavoie and Stockhammer (2013a, pp. 16-17) outline some of them, including interventions to strengthen unions, increases in unemployment bene…ts or …nancial regulation. For present purposes let us simplify and consider two approaches to raising the wage share: one that aims to improve the bargaining strength of workers in the expectation that this will translate into higher real wages, and one that aims to a¤ect …rms' pricing behavior by increasing competition in the product market, regulating monopolies, or other types of industrial policy that could reduce the markup.
Policies of the …rst kind -strengthening workers -typically get more of a hearing. At some level this seems surprising since a key Keynesian insight has it that wage bargaining does not directly determine the real wage. Let us assume, however, that a strengthening of workers leads to a rise in the real wage and a decline in the pro…t share, that is, a shift in equation (4) . Other equations in the model may be a¤ected too. Indeed, standard Marxian and Kaleckian arguments would suggest that a strengthening of workers can have a negative impact on the 'business climate' and 'animal spirits' (Kalecki (1943) ).
The Marxian/Kaleckian argument can be questioned. Using the Dutt speci…cation of investment, one could argue, for instance, that the pro…t rate enters the investment equation (1) precisely in order to capture the e¤ects of work-ers' strength and the general business climate. That is not the way in which the speci…cation is usually defended but, more importantly, an argument along these lines could leave the uncomfortable impression that somehow the parameters of the equation can be seen as completely independent of policies and institutional structures. This is not, I believe, a route that most post-Keynesians would want to travel. It would be quite paradoxical to do so: the ahistorical and institution-blind approach of mainstream economics has been a recurrent theme in heterodox critiques of mainstream models. Thus, an a-priori rejection of shifts in investment following a rise a workers' power would seem hard to defend. Consider therefore the case in which the accumulation function shifts down as a result of policy measures to strengthen workers.
If w represents an indicator of workers' strength and if the shift in the accumulation function a¤ects the parameter in equation (1), we have
Using (6)- (7) it follows that
Now consider an approach centered on the goods market, and assume that industrial policy can a¤ect the markup. Formally, let p be an indicator of goods market competition and assume that d =d p < 0: Industrial policy may also have rami…cations for other behavioral equations, but there would seem no reason to believe that the shifts will be exactly the same as those produced by the strengthening of workers. The case for a negative impact on the investment function (over and above what is captured by the pro…t term) would seem to be weaker, and for the purposes of this example I shall assume that the investment and saving equations are una¤ected by the changes in p .
The assumption of unchanged investment and saving behavior implies that in this case we get
Comparing (25) and (26) it is apparent that for some parameter values the reduced-form pro…t-growth correlations will be positive if the shifts in distribution are brought about by strengthening workers (changes in w ) but negative if they are brought about by increasing competition (changes in p ):
The speci…c assumptions in this example can be challenged. I want to emphasize, however, that the general argument does not depend on these assumptions. It only requires the possibility that policies that shift distribution by a certain amount can di¤er in their e¤ects on one or more of the other equations. This argument -it seems to me -should not be contentious to economists who believe that institutions matter. Figure 1 illustrates the general argument. The original equilibrium is at E 1 ; and two interventions are considered. Both interventions shift the vertical curve to (z 2 ). The e¤ect on the g-curve, however, depends on the type of intervention: one intervention shifts the growth curve down with a new equilibrium at E 2 ; the other intervention leaves the growth curve unchanged and the new equilibrium is at E 3 . The …rst intervention would appear to suggest a pro…t-led economy; the second would appear to suggest a wage-led economy.
Figure 1 about here
Special cases of the general argument have appeared in the literature. Skott (1989) analyzed di¤erences in the e¤ects of increases in workers' strength and increases in competition, as in the example above. Blecker (1989 Blecker ( , 2011 has made a similar point with respect to foreign trade. A reduction in the pro…t share raises exports if it is the result of a fall in price for given money wages and a given nominal exchange rate. By contrast, reductions in the pro…t share that derive from an increase in money wages or an appreciation of the exchange rate may cause a decline in exports and lead to downward pressure on aggregate demand and economic growth.
Pro…t-led growth or growth-led pro…ts?
Section 4 left out feedback e¤ects from aggregate demand to income distribution. In terms of the general equations in section 3, it was assumed that H x = 0. It would seem hard, however, to exclude the possibility that prices and pro…t shares respond to demand conditions. Certainly, the in ‡uence of demand on pricing was accepted by early post-Keynesians. Steindl (1952, p. 228), for instance, argued that the pro…t function will depend on the degree of utilisation (a high utilisation shifting it upwards, and a low utilisation downwards)
Robinson took a similar position. She assumed (Robinson, 1962, p. 46 ) that competition (in the short-period sense) is su¢ciently keen to keep prices at the level at which normal capacity output can be sold.
In fact, proponents of the 'wage-led' / 'pro…t-led' terminology -including the early contributions by Dutt and Marglin-Bhaduri -also posited links from the utilization rate to the pro…t share. 3 But the implications of a two-way interaction do not always seem to be fully appreciated.
Formalizing the Steindl-Robinson argument, 4 the pro…t share is predetermined at any moment but responds gradually to utilization, shifting upwards (downwards) when utilization is high (low). Thus, let
where _ = d =dt is the rate of change of the pro…t share. This dynamic equation for the pro…t share can be combined with the generic post-Keynesian speci…-cation of investment and saving. The utilization rate is determined by the equilibrium condition for the product market in the short run,
where the sign of u 0 ( ) depends on the magnitudes of the di¤erent partial derivatives of i(u; ) and s(u; ): For concreteness, assume that aggregate demand is stagnationist, that is, u 0 ( ) < 0 in the relevant range for the pro…t share. We then have
and
It follows that there is (at most) one stationary solution and that this solution is stable (if it exists). Consider the case in which the stationarity condition for the pro…t share (h(u; ) = 0) yields a positive relation between and g, and assume that the IS relation (goods market equilibrium) implies a negative relation between g and , as shown in Figure 2 . 5 The variables are di¤erent, but formally the situation is now completely analogous to the IS-MP example in section 3; shocks to animal spirits (shifts in the g( ) curve) correspond to shifts in the IS curve. These shocks change the growth rate and the pro…t share in the same direction. Since
We now have
the exogenous shifts come from shocks to animal spirits one could reasonably talk of a growth-led pro…t share. 6 
Figure 2 about here
The example is exceedingly simple but the lesson is general: the presence of a two-way relation between aggregate demand and income distribution complicates any attempt to draw causal inference from reduced-form correlations between economic growth and the distribution of income. Post-Keynesian economists are clearly aware of this identi…cation problem. But the labeling of economies as wage or pro…t led tends to obscure the issues. 7 The problem is not just econometric. Consider the general setting in section 3 and assume that somehow the problems of identi…cation and endogeneity bias have been resolved and that we have a clean estimate of the F (y; Z) function. An upward shift in the H function will a¤ect the equilibrium solution for y but complete knowledge of the F function does not tell us whether the equilibrium solution rises or falls. The change in y will depend on the properties of the H(x; Z) function as well as on the F function. To see this, assume for simplicity that there is a shock to a single exogenous variable z and that this variable does not enter the F function. Thus,
and,
Total di¤erentiation implies that
Knowing the value of F 0 does not determine the sign of dx=dz. Figures 3a and  3b illustrate the issue. The F function is taken to be positively sloped and unchanged in the two …gures. The H curve is also positively sloped, but ‡atter than F in …gure 3a and steeper than F in …gure 3b. In both …gures the shock to z leads to an upward shift in the H curve. In …gure 3a the equilibrium solution for y increases; in …gure 3b the equilibrium solution for y decreases. if income distribution in a country is shifting in favour of pro…t recipients, does this by itself have favourable consequences on aggregate demand in the short run, on the growth rate of aggregate demand in the long run, or on the growth rate of labour productivity? If indeed this shift towards pro…ts has favourable repercussions on the economy, as we have just de…ned them, then we shall say that this economy is in a pro…t-led economic regime. If not, if the shift towards pro…ts has a negative impact on the economy, then the economy is in a wage-led economic regime.
Disregarding the other performance indicators, it is not entirely clear how this de…nition should be interpreted when there are feedback e¤ects from growth to distribution. If 'shifting in favor of pro…ts' is interpreted as an ex post outcome in which for some reason pro…ts have increased, then the de…nition would seem to refer to the reduced-form correlation between growth and distribution. In this case no causality can be assigned and the correlation will depend on the nature of the shocks. If the 'shifting' represents an upward shift in the functional relation between the pro…t share and growth (a shift to the right of the (g) curve in a diagram with and g on the axes); the implications depend on the slopes of both the g and the curves. Yet, the suggested test for whether an economy is wage-led refers exclusively to the direct e¤ect of changes in the pro…t share on aggregate demand and economic growth (Lavoie and Stockhammer, p.
21):
an economy is in a wage-led demand regime when an increase in the wage share (or a decrease in the pro…t share) leads to an increase in the sum of the components of aggregate demand; and we will say that an economy is in a pro…t-led demand regime when an increase in the pro…t share (or a decrease in the wage share) leads to an increase in the sum of the components of aggregate demand.
This test also dominates much of the empirical literature: economies are declared wage or pro…t led on the basis of regressions that aim to identify the direct e¤ects of the pro…t share on aggregate demand and economic growth (section 7 below). This approach is conceptually misguided if there are feedback e¤ects from the growth rate and the level of aggregate demand to the distribution of income.
Adding a labor market
The criticisms in sections 3-5 apply broadly to the concept of a 'wage or pro…t led economy'; they are not speci…c to any particular version of the generic postKeynesian economy in equations (10)- (11) . This section introduces an extension of the generic model.
Most post-Keynesian models and almost all Kaleckian models leave out any consideration of employment rates and the labor market. 8 This approach could be justi…ed by a dual-economy argument. Economies may appear to ‡uctuate around levels associated with unemployment rates in the range from 2-12 percent, but in fact there may be no e¤ective labor market constraints on economic growth: immigration, induced technical change or the presence of internal reservoirs of underemployment could imply that the growth rate is determined exclusively by the growth in aggregate demand. The analysis in sections 4-5 accepted this premise.
The dual-economy argument has merit with respect to many LDCs but not, I would argue, for economies like the US, Japan and most parts of Europe. Undoubtedly, there is some endogeneity in the growth of the labor supply in e¢ciency units, but I see neither empirical nor theoretical support for a reverse Say's law in which any long-run growth rate in aggregate demand can be met by increases in employment and productivity. Thus, it may be of interest to consider a labor constrained economy. A labor constrained economy need not always be at full employment in any meaningful sense, but long-run growth is constrained by the 'natural growth rate', n, using Harrod's terminology. The natural growth rate is often taken to be exogenous, but an economy can be labor constrained without the exogeneity assumption: the natural growth rate may depend on other variables, including the employment rate.
Models that assume equality between the long-run average of the actual growth rate and the natural growth rate need to consider the mechanisms behind the equalization. It is typically di¢cult to establish a ‡oor under the growth rate -that is, without policy intervention the actual growth rate could stay below the natural rate, leading to ever-increasing unemployment as the employment rate goes to zero. The ceiling on actual growth is easy, however: with a …xed coe¢cient production function, output cannot grow faster than the labor supply (in e¢ciency units) in the long run, and capitalist …rms will not keep investing in more capacity if they cannot …nd workers. 9 This observation suggests a simple way to modify the benchmark model in section 2: following Flaschel and Skott (2006) and Ryoo and Skott (2008) , the accumulation rate may depend inversely on the employment rate. 10 Shortages of workers may have a direct e¤ect on …rms' hiring, but broader forces are also at work. As employment increases, workers get stronger and the business climate deteriorates, as suggested by Marx and Kalecki (cf. above).
The relationship between accumulation and employment is likely to be nonlinear: a rise in employment from 80% to 81% may have a negligible e¤ect on accumulation, a rise from 98% to 99%, by contrast, may have a large e¤ect 8 There are exceptions, also among Kaleckian models, but when labor markets are introduced it is often assumed that the utilization rate can be used as an indicator of the employment rate (e.g. Barbosa-Filho and Taylor (2006) and Sasaki et al. (2013) ).
9 Skott (1989) assumes that …rms' pricing and output decisions (rather than the investment decision) depend on the state of the labor market. The two mechanisms, which have similar e¤ects, are not mutually exclusive. The empirical results in Skott and Zipperer (2012) suggest that the employment rate a¤ects both output and investment decisions.
1 0 This assumption is consistent with the analysis in Robinson (1962, pp. 54-56).
(it is this non-linearity that accounts for the asymmetry between establishing ceilings and ‡oors). For present purposes the asymmetry is irrelevant, and I shall use a linear extension of the Marglin-Bhaduri equation,
where e = L=N is the employment rate.
Normalizing the labor productivity to one (by measuring employment and the labor force in e¢ciency units), the employment rate can be written as a product of the utilization rate (the output capital ratio) and the ratio of the capital stock to the labor force (k = K=N );
Using the classical saving function (2),
the conditions for steady growth at the natural rate can now be written
The …rst equation is the equilibrium condition for the product market; the second equation gives the required equality between the natural rate of growth and the accumulation rate. For the sake of argument, assume that the pro…t share is an exogenous variable and that the issues in sections 3-5 do not arise. With = , equations (39)- (40) can be solved for u and k :
If the natural growth rate is exogenously given, changes in distribution have level e¤ects on the employment rate. We have
1 1 An autonomous referee found this equation "alien to the Kaleckian approach", suggesting that "Kaleckian models are not labor constrained".
My own view is that if the term "Kaleckian" is de…ned to exclude the e¤ects of unemployment on …rms' investment and price/output decisions, then Kaleckian models become largely irrelevant for an understanding of many real-world economies. But this is a di¤erent issue; for present purposes, it does not matter whether the speci…cation is "Kaleckian".
Growth e¤ects (in addition to level e¤ects) can be introduced by assuming that the natural growth rate depends on the employment rate, i.e. let n + = (e); 0 0
The underlying mechanism behind (44) could be induced technical progressa tight labor market gives …rms a stronger incentive to search for labor saving innovations. Induced changes in the labor supply as a result of migration or changes in the participation rate would have similar e¤ects.
Combining (43)- (44) we have e + (e ) (e ) s = +
Total di¤erentiation of equation (45) implies that
where the function and its partial derivative e are given by
The sign of the partial derivative e is likely to be positive. The presence of employment-induced growth e¤ects is plausible but the e¤ects are likely to be weak. I shall assume therefore that e > 0: This condition is trivially satis…ed if the Keynesian stability condition is met ( < s ); it is satis…ed in the Harrodian case with > s if 0 is su¢ciently small. The conditions for wage-led growth in the labor constrained Marglin-Bhaduri model (LC-MB) can now be compared to those associated with the non-labor constrained Marglin-Bhaduri (MB) model in section 2. Consider a simple Harrodian case with > s ; < 0 and = 0. Using (17) and (47) it follows that the economy is pro…t led in the MB case but wage led in the LC-MB case (assuming e > 0). The two cases are illustrated in …gures 4 and 5. The saving function rotates upwards in both …gures when the pro…t share increases. In …gure 4 (the MB case) the result is an increase in the equilibrium solutions for both utilization and the rate of growth. In the LC-MB model, the growth rate has to be brought back to the natural rate n: This is achieved by a decline in the stationary solution for the ratio of the capital stock to the labor supply, k : A decline in k implies a lower employment rate for any given value of u; this in turn corresponds to an upward shift of the investment function in the (u; g) space. With an exogenous natural rate, the economy returns to the same growth rate but with a lower utilization rate. Allowing for employment e¤ects on the natural rate, the (e) curve describing the natural-rate would shift downwards in the (u; g) diagram as k declines, and the new stationary state will be characterized by lower economic growth (see …gure 5).
Figures 4-5 about here
The results in equations (17) and (47) may be of interest in their own right. There is also a general lesson: when the interaction across markets is taken into account, conclusions that have been derived by considering one market in isolation may no longer hold. This is a lesson that should be familiar to Keynesians. The problem with pre-Keynesian economics was that important mistakes have been made through extending to the system as a whole conclusions which have been correctly arrived at in respect of a part of it taken in isolation (Keynes 1936 , p. xxxii, preface to the French edition)
The pre-Keynesians were guilty of extrapolating from an analysis of the labor market in isolation to the economy as a whole. The dangers of extrapolation also arise when trying to move from a partial analysis of the product market to the economy as a whole. A similar argument applies to discussions of …nancial-ization; the e¤ects of …nancialization depend critically on the speci…cation of the non-…nancial aspects of the economy, including both goods and labor markets . It may be worth noting that the LC-MB case illustrates the possibility of stabilizing cross-market interactions. To examine stability, the short run dynamics need to be speci…ed. Let
where g d and n + are given by (36) and (44). 12 Equation (50) captures a standard Harrodian adjustment; 13 equation (51) follows from the de…nition of k as the ratio of capital to the labor supply. 1 2 The utilization rate in (36) is given by the short-run equilibrium condition for the goods market: u = g=(s ): 1 3 The equation could be cast in terms of adjustments in response to deviations of actual utilization from a desired rate that is itself a function of growth, productivity and the employment rate. De…ne u d as the value of the utilization rate which makes the accumulation rate equal to the desired rate. Using (36), u d satis…es
and we have
The unique stationary solution to this two dimensional system of di¤erential equations satis…es g = n + and k = [s + (n + )( s )]=[ (n + )]. The Jacobian matrix is given by
The stability properties of the system are determined by the trace and determinant of the Jacobian. Depending on parameter values, a range of outcomes -stable as well as unstable -are possible. For present purposes the key point, however, is methodological. There is a set of meaningful parameter values, such that the goods market is unstable, leaving out the feedback e¤ects from k; that is, ( s The example shows that destabilizing Harrodian feedback e¤ects in the goods market do not necessarily imply that an economy will exhibit empirically implausible knife-edge instability. Interactions with other parts of the economy (and/or policy intervention) can stabilize the system. The steady growth path may become asymptotically stable (as in the above example) or nonlinearities can lead to bounded ‡uctuations around a steady growth path that is locally unstable (e.g. Skott (1989 Skott ( , 2015 , von Arnim and Barrales (2015), Flaschel et al. (1997) ).
Econometric evidence
A large empirical literature has investigated whether actual economies are wage or pro…t led. In accordance with the benchmark model in section 2, the focus has been on the goods market. A standard procedure has been to run regressions in which the components of aggregate demand are regressed on the pro…t share and other controls. The economy is then declared wage led if the sum of the coe¢cients on the pro…t share is negative. The results have been mixed, but according to Lavoie and Stockhammer (2013a) the evidence shows that the global economy is wage led and that the same applies to domestic demand in most countries; some open economies are pro…t led because of the e¤ects of distributional change on net exports.
Several methodological questions can be raised. As argued in section 4, there is no reason to expect a stable reduced-form relation between income distribution and growth. The correlations depend on the nature of shocks. The correlations can be positive in some countries and for some periods but negative for other countries or other periods; this can happen even without any shifts in the direct feedback e¤ects between and g (with unchanged partials F y and H x , using the notation from the general setting in section 3). Moreover, the e¤ects of shocks to exogenous variables on economic growth cannot be decided without taking into account the feedback e¤ects from aggregate demand and economic growth to distribution (section 5).
Shifts in the variables that is treated as exogenous can also a¤ect the direct feedbacks (the partials F x and H y ). This point is exempli…ed by the argument in Palley (2014) and Carvalho and Rezai (2016) . Aggregate demand may tend to be pro…t led if wage distribution is skewed heavily in favor of the rich (who have a high saving rate); a redistribution of wage income away from CEOs, bankers and sports stars reduces the saving rate out of wage income and shifts aggregate demand in a wage-led direction. An approach which treats the coe¢cient on the pro…t share as a policy invariant parameter may therefore, Palley argues, be subject to a 'Lucas critique'. 14 The Lucas critique also applies in another way. The reaction of pro…t seeking …rms to a demand shock depends on how the shock a¤ects their expectations for future demand. These expectations will be conditioned by past experience. The parameters of the investment function therefore will not be the same in two economies, one in which the level of aggregate demand is subject to persistent stochastic shocks around a constant trend rate of growth and one in which the growth rate is subject to persistent stochastic shocks. Investment functions for advanced economies arguably …t the …rst category, and in economies of this kind the response is likely to be small. The Kaleckian benchmark model without a labor market, by contrast, describes an economy in which the long-run growth rate will be a¤ected by shocks to aggregate demand (a shift in income distribution, for instance). Econometric results from economies of the …rst type say little about the parameters in an economy of the second type (Skott 2014) .
Single equation OLS regressions, …nally, will be biased if the pro…t share depends on aggregate demand (section 5). Omitted variable bias is a potential problem, too, if labor market e¤ects are excluded from the equations (section 6). The short-run correlation between capacity utilization and employment will tend to produce a negative bias in the estimate for if equation (36) describes the investment function and the employment rate is omitted from the regression.
These methodological concerns would have been alleviated if the econometric evidence had been strong and unambiguous. That is not the case. Blecker (2016, p.1) comments that for many countries the "vast empirical literature has yet to reach a consensus" on whether the economies are wage or pro…t led. This inconclusiveness should not be surprising given the methodological concerns. But there is an additional problem: despite claims to the contrary -and taking the estimated coe¢cients at face value -the regressions do not in fact support the Keynesian stability condition. This, in turn, a¤ects conclusions about the wage-led character of the economy (section 2).
Consider the results in Onaran and Galanis (2012) and take the 'Euro area 12' as an example. 15 For the 'Euro area 12' they estimate the following log-linear consumption and investment functions: 
The consumption function is estimated in di¤erences and, curiously, does not satisfy linear homogeneity, which would seem to make it suspect from a longrun perspective. The investment function is cast in terms of levels and changes in investment, output and the pro…t share; the capital stock and its utilization rates do not enter the equation.
Onaran and Galanis claim that their results support the Keynesian stability condition in the benchmark model. In order to assess the claim we need an estimate for the long-run sensitivity of the accumulation rate (I=K) to a change in utilization (Y =K). The investment equation does not provide that directly, but an estimate can be inferred. The growth rates of investment, output and capital are all equal in steady growth, and the ratios I=Y; Y =K and the pro…t share are constant. This outcome is consistent with the estimated regression if we assume that the coe¢cients on log I 1 and log Y 1 (0.203 and 0.207, respectively) are identical, a restriction that is clearly consistent with the econometric results. If we denote the common growth rate by g, the long-run version of equation (54) can be written 
The function is non-linear but total di¤erentiation (keeping constant) gives
Using the benchmark values g + = 0:1 and u = 0:5, the equation implies that dg=du 0:6: Given the way it has been obtained, this long-run value must be taken with a pinch of salt. Still, it is the point estimate implied by the econometric results and taking the regression at face value, the saving rate (a weighted average of saving rates out of wages and pro…ts) would need to exceed 0.6 in order to satisfy the Keynesian stability condition. This minimum value is far above the plausible range for the Euro area (or other advanced economies).
Thus, the Keynesian stability fails to hold and what looked like a wage-led economy may in fact be pro…t led (section 2). 16 These results are inconsistent with Onaran and Galanis' conclusions. It appears that they may be calculating long-run e¤ects of utilization on accumulation by looking at the sensitivity of the level of investment to a change in the level of output, keeping the growth rates constant. 17 This calculation would be consistent with their stated elasticity of I with respect to Y . It is not the relevant calculation, however, for an evaluation of the long-run stability condition in the Kaleckian model: the growth rate cannot be taken as constant if one wants to examine the e¤ects of utilization on economic growth. To make this point in a di¤erent way, consider the extreme Harrodian case in which accumulation is perfectly elastic with respect to changes in utilization: the long-run investment function is vertical and can be written simply as u = u d where u d is the desired output capital ratio (utilization rate). With this Harrodian speci…cation, a level increase in output generates a level increase in the capital stock. We have
and the long-run e¤ect on investment becomes
Using benchmark values for the depreciation rate (0:07) and the desired output capital ratio (0:5), the long-run sensitivity of investment to a level increase in output is 0.14 in this extreme Harrodian model. The long-run sensitivity of the accumulation rate to utilization, by contrast, is in…nite.
Concluding remarks
My intention in this paper is not to deny or play down the signi…cance of the functional distribution of income. Other dimensions of the distribution of income may be at least as important from the perspective of equality or social justice, and some of the dramatic changes in inequality fail to be captured by movements in the pro…t share. 18 But clearly the functional distribution is important, and it interacts with other aspects of economic performance. I do not believe, however, that the current focus on wage versus pro…t led growth has been very helpful.
From a theoretical perspective the wage/pro…t led terminology obscures signi…cant issues. I have argued that (i) the pro…t share is itself an endogenous variable, and the precise nature of the underlying exogenous shocks can be critical: correlations can be positive for some changes but negative for others; (ii) the wage/pro…t led terminology is misleading by suggesting a unidirectional causality from distribution to aggregate demand: distribution can be directly a¤ected by shifts in aggregate demand, and these feedback e¤ects in ‡uence the impact of shocks to exogenous variables on economic growth; and (iii) the reduced-form correlations between growth and distribution depend on interactions with other markets, including the labor market.
These concerns provide strong reasons to re-think the way the inequality issue has been addressed in (much of) heterodox macroeconomics. The concept of a 'wage led economy' is ‡awed in the same way that concepts of interest-led economies would be ‡awed. Disregarding this conceptual issue, the weakness of the empirical evidence raises another question. Would I advocate an increase in inequality if it could be established that a rise in inequality tends to raise the rate of economic growth? Certainly not, and I expect that many -both economists and non-economists -would choose the same answer. 19 It is dangerous to base policy recommendations for lower inequality on their growth-enhancing bene…ts. It is dangerous for a number of reasons. The weakness of the empirical evidence and the theoretical problems with the concepts provide one set of reasons. A general uneasiness about the universal bene…ts of higher growth may also weaken growth-based arguments; involuntary unemployment is a scourge, but environmental concerns as well as negative consumption externalities (a la Veblen-Duesenberry-Sen-Frank) suggest that economic growth as usually measured should not be the primary concern, at least for advanced economies. Most importantly, however, we are not in a world in which only one instrument -the share of pro…ts -a¤ects aggregate demand and economic growth; in fact, as argued in sections 4 and 5, the pro…t share is not even an instrument but itself an outcome. A focus on wage-versus pro…t-led growth distracts attention from the possibility that policy instruments can di¤er signi…cantly in the way they a¤ect inequality and economic growth (and other variables). These di¤erences can be useful.
Instruments -including labor market policies, the regulation of …nancial and non-…nancial sectors, taxes, transfers, public investment and education policy -can be combined to move income distribution towards greater equality without reducing aggregate demand or economic growth. If it were the case that lower inequality tends to reduce aggregate demand, there would be ways to address this problem: a more expansionary monetary or …scal policy is the obvious one. 20 Measures to increase equality and social justice need not pass a 'do-they-increase-economic-growth' test. If greater equality is considered desirable for other reasons, a test of this kind would produce an urgency to …nd both theoretical arguments and empirical evidence in favor of wage-led conclusions. Theories, however, should not be judged on whether they give some pre-ordained, desired conclusions, and the heterodox tradition does itself a disfavor if its understanding of how the world actually works becomes based on wishful thinking. Is there reason to fear a bias of this kind? Perhaps not. But heterodox economists typically have no di¢culty seeing the con…rmatory bias when mainstream economists search for evidence that con…rm their prior beliefs (a belief, for instance, in labor market rigidities and generous welfare spending as the causes of high European unemployment).
Am I setting up a straw man? I would be delighted to hear that no reader interprets the literature on wage-led economies as suggesting that faster growth provides a key argument for addressing inequality. But if there is no intention to send this message, why focus so heavily on whether economies appear to be wage led or pro…t led? It is time to move beyond the notion of wage and pro…t led economies. Let us analyze the e¤ects of speci…c interventions to reduce inequality. And if these interventions were to have adverse consequences for aggregate demand, let us consider ways to address these demand problems. The important point is that the TINA argument is invalid: there are alternatives to neoliberal policies and increasing inequality. We do not need the wage/pro…t led terminology to make this point. 
